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Abstract
In this paper we we will argue against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement which
has been implicitly grounded on several widespread (metaphysical) presuppositions which have no
relation whatsoever to the formalism of QM. We will show how these presuppositions have been
introduced through a naive interpretation of the quantum mathematical structure which assumes
dogmatically that the theory talks about “small particles” represented by pure states (in general,
superpositions) which suddenly “collapse” when a measurement takes place. In the second part of
this paper we will present a non-collapse approach to QM which makes no use whatsoever of particle
metaphysics, escaping the need to make reference to space-time separability or the restriction to
certain predictions of definite valued binary properties. Our paper ends up concluding the essential
need to redefine the notion of quantum entanglement, at least in the cases of: i) “non-collapse”
interpretations of QM; or, ii) any other interpretation which abandons the idea that QM makes
reference to “small particles”.
Keywords: Logos, Entanglement, Potential Coding.
Introduction
The notion of entanglement plays today the most central role in what might be regarded to be the
origin of a new groundbreaking technological era. In the specialized literature, this research field falls
under the big umbrella of what is called quantum information processing. This term covers differ-
ent outstanding non-classical technical developments such as, for example, quantum teleportation,
quantum computation and quantum cryptography. Without exception, all these new technologies
are founded on the notions of quantum superposition and entanglement. Even though today, tech-
nicians, computer scientists, cryptographers and engineers are rapidly advancing in the creation of
new technological devices and algorithms, it is interesting to notice that the notion of entaglement
remained almost unnoticed for half a century since its coming into life in 1935 when Albert Einstein,
Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen discussed what would later become known as the famous EPR
∗This paper is an extended version of the discussion and arguments presented in the first part of [23].
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Gedankenexperiment. In that same year, Erwin Schro¨dinger in a series of papers gave its name to the
new born concept. He discussed in depth what he called entanglement (Verschrr¨ankung in German)
and showed through the now famous ‘cat paradox’ how quantum correlations rapidly expanded into
the classical domain. This new concept was regarded with horror by the community of physicists.
“Spooky” was the name they invented to bully the still very young notion of entanglement. But after
half a century, with the new technical possibilities, what Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen and Schro¨dinger
had critically imagined, was now verifiable in the lab. The results of experiments confirmed, against
their classical prejudices, the predictions of the theory of quanta. Entanglement grow then rapidly,
becoming one of the key concepts used within today’s quantum technology. And as in the story of
Hans Christian Andersen, the ugly duckling became the most powerful swan.
However, still today, the concept of entanglement has deep difficulties regarding its definition. In
this paper we will argue that the reason behind these difficulties are related to a more fundamental
problem within the definition of entanglement itself. In order to understand how this happened we
need some history. Since its origin in 1935, the concept was related to two main famous metaphysical
presuppositions, introduced within the axiomatic formulation of QM in a completely ad hoc manner.
The first idea is there exists a “collapse” of the quantum wave function each time we measure a quan-
tum system (the projection postulate). The second idea —also completely foreign to the mathematical
formalism of the theory— was that, since QM makes reference to “small particles”, the principle of
separability can be used in order to analyze quantum phenomena. In this paper we attempt to crit-
icize these metaphysical presuppositions on which the notion of entanglement has been built. Our
conclusion will be that any interpretation of QM which abandons the existence of collapses and the
reference to “small particles” will necessarily impose the need to create a new definition of quantum
entanglement.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we go back to the original definitions of separability
and entanglement presented in 1935 by Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen [30]. In section 2, we present the
contemporary definition of quantum entanglement and show how the metaphysics of particles has
played a fundamental role by allowing to introduce the notion of pure state as well as the principle
of separability. Section 3 discusses the possibilities to advance, beyond the classical metaphysics of
particles, taking as a fundament of reasoning only the orthodox quantum formalism. In section 4,
we conclude the necessity of producing a new definition of quantum entanglement, at least in the
cases of: i) non-collapse interpretations of QM; and ii) interpretations which do not make use of the
metaphysics of particles. Finally, in section 5, we present the conclusions of the paper.
1 The Origin of Entanglement: EPR’s Gedankenexperiment
Critical thought is, above all, the possibility of analysis of the foundation of thought itself. The
analysis of the conditions under which thinking becomes possible. By digging deeply into the ba-
sic components of thinking, one is able to understand the preconditions and presuppositions which
support the architecture of argumentation itself. At the heart of the orthodox definition of quantum
entanglement lies the analysis of the EPR Gedankenexperiment presented by Einstein, Podolsky and
Rosen in [30]. A critical analysis of the mentioned argument has been of course already provided
within the foundational literature —between many others— by Diederik Aerts [1, 2] and Don Howard
[35]. In the following, we attempt to extend this analysis paying special attention to the notion of
separability and to the famous definition of element of physical reality in order to approach, later on,
the presuppositions involved within definition of quantum entanglement.
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1.1 Einstein’s (Spatio-Temporal) Separability Principle
Even though Albert Einstein was certainly a revolutionary in many aspects of his research, he was
also a classicist when considering the preconditions of physical theories themselves. His dream to
create a unified field theory was grounded in his belief that physical theories, above all, must always
discuss in terms of specific situations happening within space and time. In this respect, the influence
of transcendental philosophy in Einstein’s thought cannot be underestimated [37]. That space and
time are the forms of intuition that allow us to discuss about objects of experience was one of the most
basic a priori dictums of Kantian metaphysics, difficult to escape even for one of the main creators of
relativity theory. In a letter to Max Born dated 5 April, 1948, Einstein writes:
“If one asks what, irrespective of quantum mechanics, is characteristic of the world of ideas of
physics, one is first stuck by the following: the concepts of physics relate to a real outside world,
that is, ideas are established relating to things such as bodies, fields, etc., which claim a ‘real
existence’ that is independent of the perceiving subject —ideas which, on the other hand, have been
brought into as secure a relationship as possible with the sense-data. It is further characteristic
of these physical objects that they are thought of as arranged in a space-time continuum. An
essential aspect of this arrangement of things in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time,
to an existence independent of one another, provided these objects ‘are situated in different parts
of space’. Unless one makes this kind of assumption about the independence of the existence (the
‘being-thus’) of objects which are far apart from one another in space —which stems in the first
place in everyday thinking— physical thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible. It is
also hard to see any way of formulating and testing the laws of physics unless one makes a clear
distinction of this kind.” [10, p. 170]
This precondition regarding objects situated in different parts of space can be expressed, following
Howard [36, p. 226], as a principle of spatio-temporal separability:
Separability Principle: The contents of any two regions of space separated by a non-vanishing
spatio-temporal interval constitute separable physical systems, in the sense that (1) each possesses its
own, distinct physical state, and (2) the joint state of the two systems is wholly determined by these
separated states.
In other words, the presence of a non-vanishing spatio-temporal interval is a sufficient condition for
the individuation of physical systems and their associated states. Everything must “live” within
space-time; and consequently, the characterization of every system should be discussed in terms of
yes-no questions about physical properties. But, contrary to many, Einstein knew very well the
difference between a conceptual presupposition of thought and the conditions implied by mathematical
formalisms. In this respect, he also understood that his principle of separability was only for him a
necessary metaphysical condition for doing physics. More importantly, he was aware of the fact there
was no logical inconsistency in dropping the separability principle in the context of QM. At the end
of the same letter to Born he points out the following:
“There seems to me no doubt that those physicists who regard the descriptive methods of quantum
mechanics as definite in principle would react to this line of thought in the following way: they
would drop the requirement for the independent existence of the physical reality present in different
parts of space; they would be justified in pointing out that the quantum theory nowhere makes
explicit use of this requirement.” [10, p. 172]
This passage shows that Einstein was completely aware of the fact that QM is not necessarily commit-
ted to the metaphysical presupposition of space-time separability. But let us now turn to the kernel
of the EPR argument, namely, their discussion regarding the sufficient conditions for defining what
must be considered as physically real.
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1.2 EPR’s Sufficient Condition for Physical Reality
The notion of physical reality is of course the key element within the EPR line of argumentation
and reasoning. Already in the first page of the paper, [30], Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen introduce
the following “reality criterion” which stipulates a sufficient condition for considering an element of
physical reality:1
Element of Physical Reality: If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an
element of reality corresponding to that quantity.
The relation drawn by the criterion is that between a certain prediction on the one hand, and
the value of a physical quantity (or property) of the system on the other. Certainty is understood
as “probability equal to unity”. Notice that this remark is crucial in order to filter the predictions
provided by QM. Only those related to probability equal to one, p = 1, can be considered to be related
to physical reality. This means, implicitly, that the rest of the quantum mechanical probabilistic
predictions which are not equal to one —namely, those which pertain the interval between 0 and
1—, p ∈ (0, 1), are simply not considered. Given a quantum state, Ψ, there is only one meaningful
operational statement (or property) that can be predicted with certainty. This leads to the conclusion
that only one property can be regarded as being actual. The rest of quantum properties are considered
as being indeterminate. The important point is that the “non-certain” predictions are not directly
related to physical reality. Unlike real actual properties, indeterminate properties are considered as
being only “possible” or “potential” properties; i.e., properties that might become actual in a future
instant of time (see for a detailed analysis [49]). Until these properties are not actualized they remain
in an unclearly defined limbo, in the words of Heisenberg [32, p. 42], they stand “in the middle
between the idea of an event and the actual event, a strange kind of physical reality just in the
middle between possibility and reality.” The filtering of indeterminate properties —something which,
from an operational perspective, seems completely unjustified—, is directly related to the actualist
spacio-temporal (metaphysical) understanding of physical reality which Einstein so willingly wanted
to retain. As he made the point [38]: “that which we conceive as existing (‘actual’) should somehow
be localized in time and space. That is, the real in one part of space, A, should (in theory) somehow
‘exist’ independently of that which is thought of as real in another part of space, B.” As we discussed
in detail in [21], it is not so difficult to see —if we dig a bit deeper— that this actualist understanding
of existence is grounded in the classical representation of physics provided in terms of an actual state
of affairs and binary valuations.
But, as noticed by Bohr himself in his famous reply to EPR [8], it is the first part of the definition
which introduces a serious “ambiguity”. Indeed, the previous specification, “If, without in any way
disturbing a system,” refers explicitly to the possibility of measuring the system in question. It
thus involves an improper scrambling between ontology and epistemology, between physical reality
and measurement. A scrambling —let us stress—, completely foreign to all classical physics. This
scrambling, might be regarded as one between the many “quantum omelettes” created during the early
debates of the founding fathers [39, p. 381]. In fact, this criteria contradicts one of the most interesting
characterizations of physical theories provided by Einstein himself. Indeed, according to Einstein [25,
p. 175] : “[...] it is the purpose of theoretical physics to achieve understanding of physical reality
which exists independently of the observer, and for which the distinction between ‘direct observable’
and ‘not directly observable’ has no ontological significance”. This is of course, even though “the only
decisive factor for the question whether or not to accept a particular physical theory is its empirical
success.” The physical representation of a physical theory is always prior to the possibility of epistemic
1We are thankful to Prof. Don Howard for pointing us the specificity of the reality criterion.
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inquiry of which ‘measurement’ is obviously one of its main ingredients. Recalling Einstein’s famous
remark to Heisenberg [33, p. 63]: “It is only the theory which decides what can be observed.”
1.3 Collapses and Spooky Actions at a Distance
Today, classical texts that describe QM axiomatically begin stating that the mathematical interpre-
tation of a quantum system is a Hilbert space, that pure states are represented by rays in this space,
physical magnitudes by self-adjoint operators on the state space and that the evolution of the system
is ruled by the Schro¨dinger equation. Possible results of a given magnitude are the eigenvalues of the
corresponding operator obtained with probabilities given by the Born rule. In general the state is
mathematically represented as a linear superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigen-
values of the measured observables. Since it is argued that “we never observe superpositions”, the
theory requires an extra postulate which provides the missing link between quantum superpositions
and measurement outcomes. This requirement was explicitly considered by John von Neumann and
Paul Dirac in their famous books at the beginning of the thirties. As von Neunmann’s [50, p. 214]
made the point: “Therefore, if the system is initially found in a state in which the values of R cannot
be predicted with certainty, then this state is transformed by a measurement M of R into another
state: namely, into one in which the value of R is uniquely determined. Moreover, the new state,
in which M places the system, depends not only on the arrangement of M , but also on the result
of M (which could not be predicted causally in the original state) —because the value of R in the
new state must actually be equal to this M -result”. Or in Dirac’s words: “When we measure a real
dynamical variable ξ, the disturbance involved in the act of measurement causes a jump in the state
of the dynamical system. From physical continuity, if we make a second measurement of the same
dynamical variable ξ immediately after the first, the result of the second measurement must be the
same as that of the first” [29, p. 36].
The introduction of the collapse within the axiomatic formulation of the theory has produced a
series of paradoxes of which entanglement has not been the exception. The EPR Gedeankenexperiment
exposes this paradox in what seems to be a non-local influence when measuring one of the particles
on the other distant entangled partner. Indeed, if one accepts the orthodox interpretation of QM
according to which the measurement of a quantum superposition induces a “collapse” to only one of
its terms, Einstein Podolsky and Rosen then show that there then seems to exist a super-luminous
transfer of information from one particle to the other distant partner. Einstein was of course clearly
mortified by this seemingly non-local “quantum effect” which he called “spukhafte Fernwirkung”,
translated later as “spooky action at a distance”. Once the entangled particles are separated, all their
properties still remain indeterminate. But, the moment we perform a measurement of an observable
in one of the particles we also find out instantaneously what is the value of the distant partner —in
case we would choose to measure the same observable. Thus, the “collapse” of one of the particles also
produces the “collapse” of the other distant entangled particle. Every time we measure an observable
in one of the particles, the other particle —as predicted by QM— will be found to possess a strictly
correlated value.2 Einsetin was not only against this “spooky action”, he was also against the addition
of a subjectively produced “collapse”. In this respect, Einstein is quoted by Everett [44, p. 7] to have
said that he “could not believe that a mouse could bring about drastic changes in the universe simply
by looking at it”. Schro¨dinger would also criticize the addition of the collapse to the theory:
“But jokes apart, I shall not waste the time by tritely ridiculing the attitude that the state-vector (or
wave function) undergoes an abrupt change, when ‘I’ choose to inspect a registering tape. (Another
2Let us remark that observability is used in this case a sufficient condition to define reality itself. There is involved
here a two sided definition of what accounts for physical reality, either in terms of computing the certainty of an outcome
(= real) or by observing an outcome which was uncertain but became actual (= real).
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person does not inspect it, hence for him no change occurs.) The orthodox school wards off such
insulting smiles by calling us to order: would we at last take notice of the fact that according to
them the wave function does not indicate the state of the physical object but its relation to the
subject; this relation depends on the knowledge the subject has acquired, which may differ for
different subjects, and so must the wave function.” [44, p. 9]
1.4 EPR’s Conclusion: Incompleteness and Hidden Variables
As it is well known, the conclusion of the EPR paper is that QM is an incomplete theory; it does not
consider all the elements of physical reality the theory should talk about. In a nut shell, the line of
reasoning in order to end up with such a fatal veredict for quantum theory runs as follows:
I. A complete theory is one which takes into account all its elements of physical reality.
II. QM presents a limit, due to to Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, to the knowledge of comple-
mentary properties (of the same quantum system).
III. If one accepts as a sufficient condition the proposed definition of an element of physical reality,
then one can argue that incompatible properties of the same quantum system must be regarded
as being all elements of physical reality, simultaneously.
IV. If incompatible complementary properties are elements of physical reality, this means they pos-
sess a definite value previous to measurement, thus contradicting Heisenberg’s relations —a
cornerstone of orthodox QM itself.
V. Since QM is incapable of considering all the elements of physical reality (i.e., the definite valued
properties) of the separated systems under study simultaneously (due to Heisenberg’s relations),
the theory is incomplete.
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen conclude that QM is incomplete. However, they also maintain that it
should be possible to “complete the theory”. A new theory that considers —unlike quantum theory—
all elements of physical reality present within an EPR type experiment could be developed in the
future. It is with this hopeful wish that they end the paper [47, p. 555]: “While we have thus shown
that the wave function does not provide a complete description of the physical reality, we left open
the question of whether or not such a description exists. We believe, however, that such a theory is
possible.” Thus, according to EPR, a description in terms of separable systems with definite valued
properties should be, in principle, possible to develop. This has been understood in the literature
—due to Bell’s reading [6]— as implying the existence of a “hidden variable theory” which is able
to account for an actual state of affairs and restore in this way an actualist description of nature.
Unfortunately, due to Bohr’s influence within 20th Century physics, all this deeply interesting debate
regarding the definition of physical reality and correlations in QM was silenced for almost half a
century.
2 Particle Metaphysics Within the Contemporary Definition of
Quantum Entanglement
As remarked by Jeffrey Bub [11], “[...] it was not until the 1980s that physicists, computer scientists,
and cryptographers began to regard the non-local correlations of entangled quantum states as a new
kind of non-classical resource that could be exploited, rather than an embarrassment to be explained
away.” The reason behind this shift in attitude towards entanglement is an interesting one. As Bub
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continues to explain: “Most physicists attributed the puzzling features of entangled quantum states
to Einstein’s inappropriate ‘detached observer’ view of physical theory, and regarded Bohr’s reply to
the EPR argument (Bohr, 1935) as vindicating the Copenhagen interpretation. This was unfortunate,
because the study of entanglement was ignored for thirty years until John Bell’s reconsideration of
the EPR argument (Bell, 1964).” Indeed, after the triumph of Bohr in the “EPR battle” [8, 30],
the notion of entanglement was almost completely erased by the orthodox community of physicists
under the Copenhagen spell. This was until an Irish researcher called John Stewart Bell working at
the Conseil Europe´en pour la Recherche Nucle´aire (CERN), wrote in 1964 a paper entitled On the
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox. In this paper he was able to derive a set of statistical inequalities
that restricted the correlations described by any classical local-realistic theory [6]. But the true
breaking point for the recognition of quantum entanglement and the possibilities it implied for quantum
information processing was the unwanted result of the famous experiment performed in Orsay at the
very beginning of the 1980s by Alain Aspect, Philippe Grangier and Gerard Roger [5]. The result
was that the Bell inequality was violated by pairs of entangled spin “particles”. As a consequence,
against Einstein and Bell’s physical intuition, the possibility for classical theories to account for such
experience was completely ruled out.
The experiment designed by Aspect and his team —repeated countless times up to the present
[7, 34]— could not be described by any classical local-(binary) realistic3 theory. The experiment was
also a sign that entanglement had to be taken seriously. It was only then that quantum computa-
tion, quantum cryptography and quantum teleportation, were developed by taking entanglement as a
resource [11]. The new notion began to rapidly populate the journals, labs and research institutions
all around the world. The technological era of quantum information processing had woken up from
its almost half century hibernation. An hibernation, let us not forget, mainly due to the uncritical
attitude of the majority of physicists who believed that Bohr had already solved everything —and
there was no reason to engage in metaphysical questions regarding physical reality.
With the advent of the new millennia the era of quantum information processing became rapidly
one of the main centers of research and technology around the globe. It then became necessary to reach
a consensus regarding the definition of quantum entanglement —a notion which stood at the basis of
all possibilities of technical analysis and development. Its definition had been clearly established by
Schro¨dinger on the basis of two main notions: separability and pure states. But while Schro¨dinger was
quite uneasy with “collapses” and the reference of the theory, the contemporary research community
has simply embraced the definition together with its problematic presuppositions. A good example is
the explanation of entanglement provided by Mintert et al.:
“Composite quantum systems are systems that naturally decompose into two or more subsystems,
where each subsystem itself is a proper quantum system. Referring to a decomposition as ‘natural’
implies that it is given in an obvious fashion due to the physical situation. Most frequently, the
individual susbsystems are characterized by their mutual distance that is larger than the size of a
subsystem. A typical example is a string of ions, where each ion is a subsystem, and the entire
string is the composite system. Formally, the Hilbert space H associated with a composite, or
multipartite system, is given by the tensor product H1 ⊗ ... ⊗HN of the spaces corresponding to
each of the subsystems.” [43, p. 61]
Already this seemingly “natural” introduction to QM makes implicit use of an interpretation of the
orthodox quantum formalism which is not “obvious” nor “self evident” at all. First, it implies the
idea that Hilbert spaces can adequately represent ‘physical systems’; small elementary particles such
as ions. And secondly, it also implies that such particles inhabit space-time, that one can make
3Even though the original term is “realistic”, we prefer to add “binary” for reasons that will become evident in the
forgoing part of the paper.
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reference to distances and that the subspaces —which can generate the whole Hilbert space— describe
‘subsystems’ —i.e., a part of the original system. The problem is that none of this atomist ideas can
be easily related to the quantum formalism. Assuming the metaphysics of particles as a “common
sense” given of physical representation, the story of entanglement is then told in the following manner.
In general, the Hilbert space associated with a composite system is given by the tensor product
H1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Hn of the spaces corresponding to each of the subsystems. The idea is that we should
focus on a finite dimensional bipartite quantum system described by the Hilbert space H = H1 ⊗H2.
After introducing separability, another essential element enters the scene, namely, the notion of pure
state. The orthodox account of pure states rests in the following operational definition: If a quantum
system is prepared in such way that one can devise a maximal test yielding with certainty a particular
outcome, then it is said that the quantum system is in a pure state. It is then stated that the pure
state of a quantum system is described by a unit vector in a Hilbert space which in Dirac’s notation
is denoted by |ψ〉.4 Assume now that each subsystem is prepared in the following pure states |ψ〉
and |ψ′〉. The state of the composite system is then |ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ′〉. Suppose that one had access to
only one of the subsystems at a time. Then, after a measurement of any local observable A ⊗ I on
the first subsystem, (where A is a hermitian operator acting on H1, and I is the identity acting on
H2), the state of the first subsystem will be projected onto an eigenstate of A, but the state of the
second subsystem will remain unchanged. If later on, one performs a second local measurement, now
on the second subsystem, it will yield a result that is completely independent of the result of the
first measurement pertaining to the first subsystem. Hence, the measurement outcomes on the two
subsystems are uncorrelated between each other and only depend on their own subsystem states.
In general, depending on the basis, a pure state in H is given by a superposition of pure states,
|ϕ〉 =
∑
ai|ψ〉i ⊗ |ψ
′〉i. For a local operator on the first subsystem, the expected value is
Tr(A⊗ I|ϕ〉〈ϕ|) = Tr1(Aρ1), ρ1 := Tr2(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|),
where Tr1 and Tr2 are the partial traces over the first and second subsystem and ρ1 is the reduced
density matrix of the first subsystem. Then, one can conclude that the state of the first subsystem
is given by ρ1 and the state of the second subsystem by ρ2 (where ρ2 := Tr1(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|)). However, the
state of the composite system is different from ρ1⊗ρ2. Moreover, if one performs a local measurement
on one subsystem, this leads to a state reduction of the entire system state, not only of the subsystem
on which the measurement had been performed. Therefore, the probabilities for an outcome of a
measurement on one subsystem are influenced by the measurements on the other distant subsystem.
Thus, measurement results on subsystems are (classically) correlated.
Definition 2.1 States that can be written as a product of pure states are called product or separable
states. The states which are not separable are then defined as entangled states.
Now, let us consider mixed states. First of all, mixed product states ρ ⊗ ρ′ do not exhibit corre-
lations. However, a convex sum of different mixed product states, ̺ =
∑
piρi ⊗ ρ
′
i, where pi ≥ 0 and∑
pi = 1, yield correlated measurement results. In other words, there are local observables such that
Tr(̺A⊗B) 6= Tr(̺A⊗ I)Tr(̺ I⊗B).
These correlations can be described in terms of the classical probabilities pi, and are therefore consid-
ered classical. States of the form ̺ are called separable mixed states. The other mixed states are called
entangled mixed states. Entangled states imply quantum correlations of measurements on different
subsystems which cannot be described in terms of classical probabilities.
4As discussed in [13, 22] this definition is ambiguous due to the non-explicit reference to the basis in which the vector
is written. It is this ambiguity which, in turn, mixes the notion of ‘state of a system’ and ‘property of a system’.
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The notions of purity and separability play an essential role in the orthodox definition of quantum
entanglement. A first problem we find is that entanglement is defined in contradistinction to the
notion of separability. According to orthodoxy, that which is not separable is entangled. This purely
negative definition does not provide any direct intuitive grasp to the meaning of entanglement. Another
problem, as remarked by Li and Quiao [40, p. 1], is that the definition of separable is not even
clear when considering density operators: “A fundamental problem in the study of entanglement is
the determination of the separability of quantum states. [...] The entanglement (non-separability)
criterion for pure state is clear, by virtue of Schmidt or high order singular value decomposition
for any-number-partite system. However, none of the existing criteria for the separability of finite
dimensional mixed states are satisfactory by far. They are generally either sufficient and necessary,
but not practically usable; or easy to use, but only necessary (or only sufficient).” We believe that
these difficulties are just an expression of a much deeper problem: the improper definition of quantum
entanglement itself which has been grounded on strong metaphysical presuppositions which are not
only alien to the mathematical formalism of the theory, but even worse, explicitly contradict it. In
the following, taking as a standpoint the orthodox formalism of QM alone, we will argue against the
distinctions introduced by the unjustified application of the metaphysics of space-time entities.
3 Beyond Particle Metaphysics in QM
The metaphysical picture provided by atomist Newtonian mechanics remains a very heavy burden
for today’s quantum physics. Newton’s metaphysical representation of the world has become the
“common sense” of our time, advocated by many like a dogma that cannot be questioned. But the
worst part of this situation comes from scientists —and even philosophers— who do not even seem to
acknowledge that the Newtonian atomist picture is in fact a specific metaphysical picture with a long
history going back to the atomism proposed by Democritus and Leucippus, and not an “obvious” or
“self evident” unescapable way to talk about reality. Indeed, the notions of ‘state’ and ‘system’ applied
to the quantum formalism imply the presupposition that QM talks about individual physical entities.
This was the first intuition of the early atomic theory which found its origin in the Democritean theory
of atoms. As pointed out by Heisenberg [12, p. 218] himself: “The strongest influence on the physics
and chemistry of the past [19th] century undoubtedly came from the atomism of Democritos. This
view allows an intuitive description of chemical processes on a small scale. Atoms can be compared
with the mass points of Newtonian mechanics, and from this a satisfactory statistical theory of heat
was developed. [...] the electron, the proton, and possibly the neutron could, it seemed, be considered
as the genuine atoms, the indivisible building blocks, of matter.” In this respect, the present approach
towards quantum theory remains not only dogmatic but also unscientific in a fundamental point.
Going explicitly against what the formalism explicitly says, orthodoxy has implicitly assumed that we
already know what the theory is talking about. This is exactly the opposite standpoint of scientific
research which begins by humbly accepting the unknown. Scientific research is not a process of
justification of our prejudices regarding our “common sense” picture of reality, it quite the opposite.
The acceptance of the unknown and the effort to expand our understanding of reality. In the following
we will show it is in fact possible to understand the orthodox formalism of QM without making any
reference to “tiny particles” and strange “collapses”.
3.1 Beyond Purity, Collapses and Binary Existence
EPR’s definition of element of physical reality, which has played a central role also within the definition
of entanglement, is intrinsically related to the definition of pure state. It is only pure states which allow
us to consider observables as elements of physical reality (in the EPR sense). Pure states guarantee
the existence of an observable which is certain (probability equal to 1) if measured. It is only pure
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states which allow an interpretation of a quantum observable in terms of an actual property; i.e., a
property that will yield the answer yes when being measured. At the opposite side, mixed states
do not describe observables which, when measured, will be certain. When considering mixed states,
all observables become uncertain; they all possess a probability which pertains to the open interval
(0, 1). These properties are referred to in the literature as indeterminate or potential properties.
Indeterminate properties might, or might not become actualized in a future instant of time; they are
uncertain properties which cannot be considered as elements of physical reality (in the EPR sense).
However, as we mentioned above, a pure state in H is, in general, given by a superposition of pure
states, |ϕ〉 =
∑
ai|ψ〉i⊗|ψ
′〉i. It is at this point that the empiricist-positivist understanding of physics
—mainly as a formal scheme capable of describing observations— has deeply influenced the need to
introduce a ‘projection postulate’ that would allow to transform quantum superpositions into single
outcomes —which is, as argued by orthodoxy, what we really observe. This postulate, added to the
axiomatic formulation of the theory in a completely ad hoc manner, is then interpreted as a real
“collapse”; i.e., a physical process. The collapse takes place each time an observer decides to perform
a measurement —which, in turn, has also lead to the creation of the infamous measurement problem.
All these (metaphysical) additions and restrictions grounded on certainty, purity and collapses are
completely foreign to the orthodox Hilbert mathematical structure. The difficulties to talk about
‘systems’ composed by ‘properties’ are most extremely exposed by the superposition principle and
quantum contextuality (see [15, 20]). But also, as remarked by Dennis Dieks [26, p. 120]: “Collapses
constitute a process of evolution that conflicts with the evolution governed by the Schro¨dinger equation.
And this raises the question of exactly when during the measurement process such a collapse could
take place or, in other words, of when the Schro¨dinger equation is suspended. This question has
become very urgent in the last couple of decades, during which sophisticated experiments have clearly
demonstrated that in interaction processes on the sub-microscopic, microscopic and mesoscopic scales
collapses are never encountered.” In the last decades, the experimental research seems to confirm there
is nothing like a “real collapse” suddenly happening when measurement takes place. Unfortunately,
as Dieks [27] also acknowledges: “The evidence against collapses has not yet affected the textbook
tradition, which has not questioned the status of collapses as a mechanism of evolution alongside
unitary Schro¨dinger dynamics.”
Leaving aside metaphysical pictures and focusing only on the orthodox formalism of QM itself it is
possible to derive an important set of consequences which can guide our search for a new comprehension
of what the theory of quanta is really talking about. To take the formalism seriously means for us
to seek for an objective set of concepts which are grounded on the mathematical structure of the
formalism itself. In particular, as we have argued elsewhere [20], the key to understand the objective
aspect of the mathematical formalism of QM is not hidden, it is exposed in the invariant structure
of the theory. As Born himself reflected: [9]: “the idea of invariant is the clue to a rational concept
of reality, not only in physics but in every aspect of the world.” In physics, invariants are quantities
having the same value for any reference frame. The transformations that allow us to consider the
physical magnitudes from different frames of reference have the property of forming a group. It is this
feature which allows us to determine what can be considered the same according to a mathematical
formalism. In the case of classical mechanics invariance is provided via the Galilei transformations,
while in relativity theory we have the Lorentz transformations. In QM the invariance of the theory is
exposed by no other than Born’s famous rule.
Born Rule: Given a vector Ψ in a Hilbert space, the following rule allows us to predict the average
value of (any) observable P .
〈Ψ|P |Ψ〉 = 〈P 〉
This prediction is independent of the choice of any particular basis.
This rule, which provides the invariant structure of the theory, points implicitly to the way in which
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physical reality should be conceived according to QM. Taking distance from the famous Bohrian
prohibition to consider physical reality beyond the theories of Newton and Maxwell, we have proposed
the following extended definition of what can be naturally considered —by simply taking into account
the mathematical invariance of the Hilbert formalism— as a generalized element of (quantum) physical
reality (see [14]).
Generalized Element of Physical Reality: If we can predict in any way (i.e., both probabilistically
or with certainty) the value of a physical quantity, then there exists an element of reality corresponding
to that quantity.
This redefinition implies a deep reconfiguration of the meaning of the quantum formalism and the type
of predictions it provides. It also allows to understand Born’s probabilistic rule in a new light; not as
providing information about a (subjective) measurement result, but instead, as providing objective
information of a theoretically described (potential) state of affairs. Objective probability does not
mean that particles behave in an intrinsically random manner. Objective probability means that
probability characterizes a feature of the conceptual representation accurately and independently of
any subjective choice or particular observation. This account of probability allows us to restore a
representation in which the state of affairs is detached from the observer’s choices to measure (or
not) a particular property —just like Einstein requested. This means that within our account of
QM —contrary to the orthodox viewpoint—, the Born rule always provides complete knowledge of
the state of affairs described quantum mechanically; in cases where the probability is equal to 1 and
also in cases in which probability is different to 1. In other words, both pure states and mixed states
provide maximal knowledge of the (quantum) state of affairs. Since there is no essential mathematical
distinction, both type of states have to be equally considered; none of them is “less real”, or “less well
defined” than the other according to the mathematics. Thus, it is not necessary at all to distinguish
between pure states and mixed states. Or, in other words, there is nothing within the mathematical
formalism which allows to build such a distinction.5
An explicit account of the orthodox quantum formalism without reference to collapses or particles
has been already put forward in the categorical terms the logos approach to QM. Following [21], let C
be a category and let C be an object in C. Let us define the category over C denoted C|C . We assume
that the reader is familiar with the definition of a category. Objects in C|C are given by arrows to C,
p : X → C, q : Y → C, etc. Arrows f : p→ q are commutative triangles,
X
f
//
p
  
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
❅❅
Y
q
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
C
For example, let Sets|2 be the category of sets over 2, where 2 = {0, 1} and Sets is the category of
sets. Objects in Sets|2 are functions from a set to {0, 1} and morphisms are commuting triangles,
X
f
//
p
""❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊❊
❊ Y
q
||②②
②②
②②
②②
{0, 1}
In the previous triangle, p and q are objects of Sets|2 and f is a function satisfying qf = p.
Our main interest is the category Gph|[0,1] of graphs over the interval [0, 1]. The category Gph|[0,1]
has very nice categorical properties [4, 28], and it is a logos. Let us begin by reviewing some properties
5This point has been already addressed by David Mermin in [42, Sect. VII].
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of the category of graphs. A graph is a set with a reflexive symmetric relation. The category of graphs
extends naturally the category of sets and the category of aggregates (objects with an equivalence
relation). A set is a graph without edges. An aggregate is a graph in which the relation is transitive.
More generally, we can assign to a category a graph, where the objects are the nodes of the graph and
there is an edge between A and B if hom(A,B) 6= ∅. Given that in a category we have a composition
law, the resulting graph is an aggregate.
Definition 3.1 We say that a graph G is complete if there is an edge between two arbitrary nodes. A
context is a complete subgraph (or aggregate) inside G. A maximal context is a context not contained
properly in another context. If we do not indicate the opposite, when we refer to contexts we will be
implying maximal contexts.
For example, let P1, P2 be two elements of a graph G. Then, {P1, P2} is a contexts if P1 is related to
P2, P1 ∼ P2. Saying differently, if there exists an edge between P1 and P2. In general, a collection of
elements {Pi}i∈I ⊆ G determine a context if Pi ∼ Pj for all i, j ∈ I. Equivalently, if the subgraph with
nodes {Pi}i∈I is complete.
Given a Hilbert space H, we can define naturally a graph G = G(H) as follows. Following [Op.
cit.] the nodes are interpreted as immanent powers and there exists an edge between P and Q if and
only if [P,Q] = 0. This relation makes G a graph (the relation is not transitive). We call this relation
quantum commuting relation.
Theorem 3.2 Let H be a Hilbert space and let G be the graph of immanent powers with the commuting
relation given by QM. It then follows that:
1. The graph G contains all the contexts.
2. Each context is capable of generating the whole graph G.
Proof: See [22]. 
As we mentioned earlier, an object in Gph|[0,1] consists in a map Ψ : G → [0, 1], where G is a graph.
Then, in order to provide a map to the graph of immanent powers, we use the Born rule. To each
power P ∈ G, we assign through the Born rule the number p = Ψ(P ), where p is a number between 0
and 1 called potentia. As discussed in detail in [21], we call this map Ψ : G → [0, 1] a Potential State
of Affairs (PSA for short). Summarizing, we have the following:
Definition 3.3 Let H be Hilbert space and let ρ be a density matrix. Take G as the graph of immanent
powers with the quantum commuting relation. To each immanent power P ∈ G apply the Born rule
to get the number Ψ(P ) ∈ [0, 1], which is called the potentia (or intensity) of the power P . Then,
Ψ : G → [0, 1] defines an object in Gph|[0,1]. We call this map a Potential State of Affairs.
Intuitively, we can picture a PSA as a table,
Ψ : G(H)→ [0, 1], Ψ :


P1 → p1
P2 → p2
P3 → p3
...
The introduction of intensive valuations allows us to derive a non-contextuality theorem that is
able to escape Kochen-Specker contextuality [21].
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Theorem 3.4 The knowledge of a PSA Ψ is equivalent to the knowledge of the density matrix ρΨ. In
particular, if Ψ is defined by a normalized vector vΨ, ‖vΨ‖ = 1, then we can recover the vector from
Ψ.
Proof: See [22]. 
Notice that our mathematical representation is objective in the sense that it relates, in a coherent
manner and without internal contradictions, the multiple contexts (or aggregates) to the whole PSA.
Contrary to the contextual (relativist) Bohrian “complementarity solution” grounded on his doctrine
of classical concepts, there is in this case no need of a (subjective) choice of a particular context in
order to define the “physically real” state of affairs. The state of affairs is described completely by
the whole graph (or Ψ), and the contexts bear an invariant (objective) existence independently of
any (subjective) choice. Let us remark that ‘objective’ is not understood as a synonym of ‘real’, but
rather as providing the conditions of a theoretical representation in which all subjects are detached
from the course of events. Contrary to Bohr’s claim, in our account of QM, individual subjects are not
considered as actors. Subjects are humble spectators and their choices do not change the objective
representation provided by the theory.
The introduction of a “collapse” scrambles the objective quantum theoretical representation with
subjective epistemic observations. A direct consequence of this scrambling is that the change in our
(subjective) knowledge also changes the theoretical description of (objective) reality itself.6 However,
if we simply accept that quantum probability is not making reference to measurement outcomes, but
instead characterizes an objective (intensIve) feature of the state of affairs represented by QM, then
there is no need of considering epistemic observations within the theoretical representation. In such
case, as we have shown above, we can restore the objective nature of the phenomena without the
intromission of epistemic knowledge within the description of objective quantum reality. The price to
pay is to accept that QM talks about reality in a very different way than classical physics.
3.2 Beyond Space-Time Separability
In [1], Diederik Aerts discussed the EPR paradox as an ad absurdum proof making explicit “the missing
elements of reality in the description by quantum mechanics of separated physical systems.” His deep
and interesting analysis of the EPR paper can be nicely summarized in the following passage:
“[...] what E.P.R. show is the following
Quantum mechanics describes correctly and in a complete way separated systems.
⇒ Quantities that are not compatible can have simultaneous reality.
⇒ Quantum mechanics is not complete.
From this they can conclude that
D the quantum mechanical description of separated systems is not correct or not complete,
or
E quantities that are not compatible can have simultaneous reality and hence quantum mechanics
is not complete.
E.P.R. mention in the beginning of their paper that they suppose quantum mechanics to be correct.
Hence they then also suppose quantum mechanics to give a correct description of separated systems.
Two alternatives remain in this case: the quantum mechanical description of separated systems is
incomplete or quantum mechanics is incomplete in the sense that quantities that are not compatible
can have simultaneous reality. But in any case quantum mechanics is not complete. Hence E.P.R.
can conclude that if quantum mechanics is correct, then it is not complete. What we showed in this
6This same scrambling takes place in the case of quantum contextuality and the so called “basis problem”. See for a
detailed analysis: [18].
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paper is that the incompleteness arrives fromD and not from E. Quantum mechanics is incomplete
because it does not give a complete description of separated systems.”[1, p. 427]
In [2], Aerts proposed a solution to the paradox. Holding fast to the operational definition of an
element of physical reality, his solution attempted to change QM “in order to describe adequately
separated systems”. Like Einstein, Aerts seemed willing to retain separability even at the cost of
transforming a mathematical formalism which captured —in a quantitative manner— an immense
number of phenomena. However, taking once again the orthodox formalism as a standpoint, there
is another quite obvious solution which we have investigated within the logos approach, namely, to
simply abandon space-time separability as a presupposition of the theory. We can certainly drop the
principle since, as already remarked by Einstein himself [10, p. 172], “quantum theory nowhere makes
explicit use of this requirement.” In fact, just to add to the list, there is another obvious aspect
of the formalism which precludes the possibility to understand Hilbert spaces as making references
to ‘systems’ and ‘subsystems’ and makes explicit the formal-conceptual incoherency put forward by
the orthodox “minimal” interpretation of QM. While the equation of motion in classical mechanics
can be expressed in R3 allowing an interpretation in tridimensional Euclidean space, QM works in a
configuration space. The difference is essential when attempting to consider existents within space.
Classically, if we add two systems, the properties are summed. Given two systems with a number of
properties, R and R′, respectively; their joint consideration is just the sum of the properties of each
system, namely, R + R. A paradigmatic example is the completely inelastic crash of two systems.
While before the crash the two particles are separated and their mass arem andm′, and their velocities
are v and v′, respectively; after the crash they become a (non-separable) single system of mass m+m′
with a common velocity vf . The essential property characterizing the two systems —namely, their
mass— becomes nothing else than the sum of masses. But, as we know, there is an essential difference
when considering the addition of ‘systems’ (vector spaces) in QM. If we take two rays which intersect
each other, in terms of classical set theory, the addition of the rays is just the two rays; however, in
terms of vector spaces the addition of two rays (now considered as subspaces) is more than just their
sum, it is the whole plane generated by the two rays (see also the analysis provided by Rob Griffiths
in [31, Sect. 2]). In QM, the new possibilities considered by the addition of systems are not just the
sum of the previous subsystems, they are much more.7
4 In Search of a New Definition of Quantum Entanglement
In the history of science, many times, we physicists, have been confronted with “spooky situations”.
The “spookiness” always comes from the lack of understanding. Incomprehension of the unknown
is always frightening. Just to give an example between many, the phenomena of electricity and
magnetism were regarded as “magical” since the origin of humanity itself. Pieces of stone attracting
each other without any material contact can be indeed “spooky”, not to talk about lightnings coming
from the sky. For a long period of time the only explanation was that some God, like Zeus, was
the one responsible for this process. This was until one day physicists were finally able to create a
theory called electromagnetism which explained all these different phenomena in both a qualitative and
quantitative manner. Physicists were even able to find out that these apparently different phenomena
could be quantified in terms of a unified mathematical formalism. But it was only through the
conceptual representation of ‘fields’, that we could finally grasp a deep qualitative understanding of
the phenomena. In the end, electricity and magnetism were two sides of the same represented physical
reality. Suddenly, the spookiness had disappeared.
7The logos approach provides an intuitive understanding of what is going on in terms of the capabilities of an
apparatus: adding two apparatuses allows many more possibilities than just the reductionistic sum of their previous
possibilities.
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Nobel laureate Steven Weinberg [51], when discussing about quantum entanglement, has argued
that: “What is surprising is that when you make a measurement of one particle you affect the state of
the other particle, you change its state!” This conclusion is indeed spooky, since we never observe in
our macroscopic world that objects behave in such a strange manner. A table (or chair) in one place
never affects the state of another distant table (or chair). If we do something to an object in a region
of space A, there will be no instantaneous action produced on an object situated in a distant region
B. But Weinberg’s amazement is not detached from his biased metaphysical viewpoint, it is actually
grounded on the —unjustified— assumption that QM talks about “small particles” which suddenly
“collapse” when being observed. As we have argued extensively, one simply does not find within the
formal structure of QM neither a reference to particles nor to any strange collapse process.8
Today, it is repeated that physics can only describe ‘systems’ with definite ‘states’ and ‘properties’.
This understanding of physics restricted by the classical paradigm —mainly due to Bohr’s philosophy
of physics supplemented by 20th Century positivism— has blocked the possibility to advance in the
development of a new conceptual scheme for QM. And exactly this is what David Deutsch [24] has
rightly characterized as “bad philosophy”; i.e., “[a] philosophy that is not merely false, but actively
prevents the growth of other knowledge.” In the previous sections we have shown it is possible to
advance in a representation of QM which avoids right from the start the atomist metaphysical picture
inherited from Newtonian classical mechanics. It is, as we have explicitly shown, possible to define
existence in a different way to that presupposed by atomist metaphysics. And this possibility allows to
escape the spookiness involved when attempting to understand QM through the dogmatic viewpoint of
“small particles”. To summarize, our conclusion is that in case we accept the possibility of non-collapse
interpretations of QM or even interpretations of the theory which do not make reference to ‘systems’,
the notion of quantum entanglement will require —at least in these cases— a new definition. One
that goes beyond the metaphysical presuppositions and distinctions imposed by atomist metaphysics.
The explicit derivation of this new definition exceeds the scope of the present paper which we leave
for a future work.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided arguments against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement.
We have argued that the present definition discussed in the literature is grounded on purely metaphys-
ical presuppositions which go, in fact, against what the formalism explicitly tells us. In this respect we
have shown why the notion of pure state and that of separability are not essential to the mathematical
structure of QM. The main conclusion of the paper is that, if we accept that QM does not talk about
particles and that pure states are not essential, a new definition of quantum entanglement is required.
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